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Objectives 
From this chapter the reader should gain knowledge of: 
• the basic steps in the decision-making process 
• the concepts of decision theory, taking into account the risk attitude of the decision maker(s) 
• the various choice criteria, such as expected utility model, stochastic efficiency criteria 
and expected monetary value 
• Bayes' theorem and the economic value of information 
10.1 Introduction 
The economic success of animal health management is closely related to the way in which 
decisions are taken and implemented. The decision-making process is essentially a five-step 
procedure: 
1. defining the problem or opportunity; 
2. identifying alternative courses of action; 
3. gathering information and analyse each of the alternative actions; 
4. making the decision and take action; and 
5. evaluating the outcome. 
The first step is probably the most important one. When problems are not recognized, 
continuing losses may occur, particularly with subclinical diseases and reduced fertility. 
Monitoring systems especially within herd health programs are increasingly used to register, 
and to help identify, these problems. Once a problem has been defined, it will seldom be 
the case that there are no reasonable solutions or actions to be taken (step 2). It will be 
more common that the number of alternatives has to be limited, so that each can be 
examined thoroughly. For documenting and examining the potential effects of the various 
alternative actions (step 3), it will not be feasible to have only actual field data available. 
Computer simulation has long been recognized as a complementary approach and is 
particularly attractive when real-life experimentation would be impossible, costly or 
disruptive. 
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Whichever way, and to whatever extent, the information has been provided, the fourth step 
is always taken, either consciously (by choosing the 'best' option) or not (which implicitly 
means a continuation of the available strategy). Evaluating the outcome of actions taken 
(step 5) brings the decision maker back to the first step, thus making the process a cyclical 
one. 
Decision making in animal health management has to deal with several factors over which 
the decision maker has little or no control, making the outcome of actions uncertain. 
Different criteria can be applied to what is called 'decision making under risk'. Some of 
those criteria are discussed below and illustrated with an example. 
10.2 Components of a risky decision problem 
Traditional analyses of decision making have distinguished two types of imperfect 
knowledge: risk, when the probabilities of the uncertain outcomes are known, and 
uncertainty, when they are not. However, this distinction is of little practical use and is 
discarded by most analysts today. Probabilities can be 'known' only for the so-called 
stationary stochastic processes, ie, for events where there is variability but where the sources 
and nature of the variability remain constant through time. Such processes are rare in 
practical decision making. In modern discussions and analyses, therefore, the terms risk and 
uncertainty are used more or less interchangeably. 
Any risky decision involves five components: acts, states, probabilities, consequences and 
a choice criterion (Anderson et al., 1977). Acts (aj) are the relevant actions available to the 
decision maker. They constitute the relevant set of mutually exclusive alternatives among 
which a choice has to be made. Examples of acts in animal health management are 'treat' or 
'do not treat' an animal, or 'keep' or 'replace' a specific animal. The possible events or 
states of nature (9j) must also be defined by a mutually exclusive and exhaustive listing. 
Examples of states of nature are 'good', 'average' or 'poor' rainfall, or 'severe', 'normal', 
'small' or 'no' outbreaks of a certain disease. The essence of a risky decision problem is that 
the decision maker does not know for certain which state will prevail. Some state variables 
are intrinsically continuous (eg, herd health status), but generally a discrete representation 
(such as good, average or bad) will prove adequate. Prior probabilities (Pj) reflect the 
degrees of belief held by the decision maker about the chance of occurrence of each of the 
possible states. Such probabilities are considered subjective or personal in nature. Example 
probabilities for a disease problem can be as follows: a probability of 0.2 for a 'severe' 
outbreak, 0.3 for a 'normal', 0.25 for a 'small' and 0.25 for 'no' outbreak of a certain 
disease. Depending on which of the uncertain states occurs, choice of an act leads to some 
particular consequence, outcome or payoff. Finally, some criterion of choice is necessary 
to compare the possible consequences of any act with those of any other act. One such 
criterion is the expected monetary value (EMV), defined as the summation of the possible 
money outcomes multiplied by their probabilities. 
Consider a simplified case in which a farmer can choose between two acts, ie, herd health 
programs aj and &2- The payoffs of the programs are expected to differ according to the 
actual health status of the herd. These 'states of nature' can be good, average or bad, with an 
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estimated (subjective) probability of 0.2, 0.6, and 0.2 respectively. Results are summarized 
in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.7 Payoff matrix for two herd health programs (US$) 
States of nature (6j) P(9j) Program a-] Program a2 
Herd health good (8 j) 02 ÏÔ5Ô -10000 
Herd health ave. (62) 0.6 4000 5000 
Herd health bad (63) 0.2 9000 19000 
Expected monetary value 4400 4800 
When taking into account the mean outcome (ie, expected monetary value) to compare the 
alternatives, program a2 is the preferred one. This choice, however, does not hold for the 
situation should the herd health status be good, thus making this a classical example of risky 
choice. 
10.3 Subjective expected utility model 
One of the most widely applied models for studying decision making under risk is the 
subjective expected utility (SEU) model (Anderson et ai, 1977). Using the model, actions 
are ordered according to the beliefs and risk attitudes of the decision maker. Each outcome 
is assigned a utility value (ie, preference), according to a personalized, arbitrarily scaled 
utility function. The utility values for each possible outcome of an action are weighed by 
their (subjective) probability and summed across outcomes. The resulting expected utility is 
a preference index for that action. Actions are ranked according to their levels of expected 
utility with the highest value being preferred. Farmers' attitudes towards risk vary 
depending on their objectives and financial resources, for instance. Most farmers, like 
other people, tend to be risk averse. 
Suppose that a farmer's utility function for gains and losses is adequately represented by: 
U(x) = x - 0.005X2 forx<50 
where x denotes thousands of US dollars. 
This function makes it possible to convert the money values for each of the alternatives in 
Table 10.1 to utility values (U): 
U(aj) = 0.2£/(US$1000) + 0.6£/(US$4000) + 0.2£/(US$9000) 
= 0.2(0.995) + 0.6(3.920) + 0.2(8.595) = 4.270 
U(a2) = 0.2i/(US$ -10 000) + 0.6t/(US$5000) + 0.2t/(US$19 000) 
= 0.2(-10.5) + 0.6(4.875) + 0.2(17.195) = 4.264 
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So, taking into account the risk-averse attitude of the farmer makes program aj the preferred 
one, ie, yielding the highest subjective expected utility. 
The implementation of the SEU model requires the risk preferences of decision makers 
(ie, the utility function) to be known. The notion of certainty equivalent is central to the 
measurement of these preferences, and hence to the elicitation of the utility function. When 
given a choice between (a) payment of US$1000 for sure versus (b) a chance of winning 
US$5000 with a probability of 0.25, for instance, most people will opt for (a), even though 
(b) has a higher expected monetary value. The certainty equivalent (CE) of a risky 
prospect then is the value which the decision maker is just willing to accept in lieu of the 
risky prospect. So, the relationship between the CE and the expected monetary value (EMV) 
of the outcomes tells something about the decision maker's attitude towards risk. If the 
person is averse to risk, which is normally the case, (s)he will assign a CE less than EMV. 
For people that have a preference for risk CE will be greater than EMV, while in the case 
of risk indifference CE = EMV. 
Methods of eliciting utility functions involve asking people to specify their CEs for 
specified risky prospects. According to Anderson et al. (1977), the simplest recommended 
method is based on considering an Equally Likely risky prospect and finding its Certainty 
Equivalent. In using this so-called ELCE-method, the first step is to find the CE for a 
hypothetical 50/50 lottery with the best and worst possible outcomes of the decision 
problem as the two risky consequences. The next step is to find the CE for each of the two 
50/50 lotteries involving the first-established CE and the best and worst possible outcomes. 
This process of establishing utility points is continued until sufficient CEs are elicited to plot 
the utility function. In order to obtain meaningful values it is important to provide enough 
realism for this type of game setting (Smidts, 1990). Moreover, worthwhile outcomes 
require utility functions to be described in a mathematically sound way, thus making the 
choice of the function form very important. 
10.4 Other choice criteria 
Utility functions may not always be easy to elicit. Many authors, therefore, have suggested 
alternative rules that might be used, leaving it to the individual decision maker to decide 
what criterion is the most appropriate given his/her own specific situation (Barry, 1984). 
A first group of criteria includes those that do not require probability estimates: 
• Maximin is a criterion that arises from a very pessimistic or conservative risk attitude. Each 
action is judged solely on its worst outcome, and the one that maximizes the minimum 
gain is selected. In the example of Table 10.1 the minimum gains of the two programs are 
US$1000 and -10 000 respectively, with program aj being the preferred one according to 
this criterion. 
• Minimax regret is similar to the previous criterion but it argues that the 'correctness' of a 
decision be measured by the amount by which the outcome could have been increased, 
had the decision maker known some information beforehand, and then selects the action 
with the smallest maximum increase (ie, regret). This is a criterion which has in mind 
judgment by hindsight. When choosing program &2 m Table 10.1 the maximum possible 
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regret is US$11 000 (ie, US$1000 - (-10 000), in case herd health turned out to be good), 
while with program al, this is US$10 000 (ie, US$19 000 - 9000, if herd health was bad). 
So, program al is now the preferred one. 
• Maximax simply amounts to scanning the outcome matrix to find its largest value and 
then taking the corresponding action. This is a totally optimistic criterion, and similar to 
the approach of a gambler. In Table 10.1 this would result in program a2 being taken (ie, 
US$19 000 being the largest payoff). 
A second group of criteria includes more than one single value of the outcome distribution 
and, therefore, do require probability estimates: 
• Hurwicz a index rule allows for a weighed average of the minimum and maximum 
outcome per action, and then selects the action with the highest weighed average. In 
formula: 
Max[Ij = a(Mj) + (l-a)(mj)] 
where a is supplied by the decision maker subject to 0<a<l, M; equals the maximum gain 
of action j , and m: equals the minimum gain of action j . Should a = 0.5, then the outcome in 
Table 10.1 is 0.5 x 9000 + (1-0.5) x 1000 = US$5000 for program aj and 0.5 x 19 000 + 
(1-0.5) x -10 000 = US$4500 for program a2. Program a j then is preferred. 
• Laplace principle of insufficient reason selects the action with the highest expected 
outcome, based on equal probabilities for all outcomes. Unlike the previous criteria it 
takes into account the outcomes for all events, but still ignores that one event may be 
(considered) more likely than the other. For the example in Table 10.1 this turns out to 
provide an equal outcome for the two programs, ie, (1000 + 4000 + 9000)/3 = US$4667 
for program aj and (-10 000 + 5000 + 19 000)/3 = US$4667 for program a2. 
• Expected Monetary Value is probably the best-known criterion, and is defined as the 
summation of the possible levels of outcome multiplied by their probabilities. If there are m 
possible states for the j t h action with the i t h state denoted 9j, having outcome Oj: and 
probability Pj, then the expected monetary value of the outcome is given by: 
EMV(Oj) = PJOJJ + P 2 0 2 j + ... + PmOm j = iPjOy 
It assumes that the decision maker's satisfaction is measured by the level of profit, which 
in fact is a special linear case of the more general expected utility model (ie, assuming risk 
neutrality of the decision maker). The outcome for the two programs in the example was 
already given in Table 10.1, with program a-> being the preferred one in this case. 
None of the previous criteria, however, takes account of any 'utility-based' trade-off 
between the average outcome of each strategy and its variance. That is why stochastic 
efficiency criteria (the third group to be considered) are proposed as a useful alternative, 
at least for cases where probabilities are reasonably well defined. Stochastic efficiency rules 
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satisfy the axioms of the expected utility model but do not require precise measurement of 
risk preferences. However, as opposed to the complete ordering achieved when risk 
preferences are known, they provide only a partial ordering (King & Robison, 1984). 
Stochastic efficiency rules are implemented by pairwise comparisons of cumulative 
distribution functions of outcomes (y) resulting from different actions. 
First-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) holds for all decision makers who prefer more 
to less (ie, whose first derivative of the utility function is positive). No assumptions are 
made about risk preferences of the decision maker, which widens the possibilities of 
application but limits its discriminatory power. Graphically, these conditions mean that the 
cumulative of the dominant (ie, preferred) distribution must never lie above the cumulative 
of the dominated distribution. In Figure 10.1, for example, F(y) dominates G(y) by FSD, but 
neither F(y) nor G(y) can be ordered by H(y). 
1.0 
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Figure 10.1 First- and second-degree stochastic dominance 
Second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) assumes that decision makers, in addition to 
preferring more to less, are risk averse, with utility functions having positive, nonincreasing 
slopes at all outcome levels. Under SSD, an alternative with the cumulative distribution F(y) 
is preferred to a second alternative with cumulative distribution function G(y) if 
JF(y)dy<jG(y)dy 
for all possible values of y, and if the inequality is strict for some value of y. SSD has more 
discriminatory power than FSD, but still may not effectively reduce the number of 
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alternatives. Graphically, because the accumulated area under F(y) in Figure 10.1 is always 
less than or equal to that under either G(y) or H(y), only F(y) is in the so-called SSD-
efficient set of these three alternatives. When only G(y) and H(y) are considered, neither one 
dominates the other by SSD, since the accumulated area under G(y) is less than the area 
under H(y) for low values of y, while the opposite condition occurs at high values of y. 
Stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDWRF) is a more discriminating 
efficiency criterion that allows for greater flexibility in reflecting preferences, but also 
requires more detailed information on those preferences. Formally stated, SDWRF 
establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which the cumulative function F(y) 
is preferred to the cumulative function G(y) by all decision makers whose risk attitude lies 
anywhere between specified lower and upper bounds. The method is flexible enough to 
include and investigate the impact of any specified value (King & Robison, 1984). 
PC-software has become available to perform the stochastic efficiency analyses (Goh et 
al., 1989). This was also used to carry out the analyses for the example given in Table 
10.1. Results are summarized in Table 10.2, together with the outcome of the previously 
discussed criteria. 
Table 10.2 Outcome according to the various decision criteria (US$). The preferred programs 
are underlined or indicated with an * 
Herd Health Programs 
Criteria 
Maximin 
Minimax regret 
Maximax 
Hurwicz a rule (a = 1/2) 
Laplace principle of insufficient reason 
Expected monetary value 
1000 
10000 
9000 
5000 
4667 
4400 
-10000 
11000 
19000 
4500 
4667 
4800 
FSD 
SSD 
SDWRF (with risk aversion assumed to be): 
- low 
- considerable 
-high 
Table 10.2 shows that choices appear to vary considerably among the criteria. The more risk 
averse types of criteria lead to choice of program aj, while with the expected monetary 
value criterion (assuming risk neutrality) program a2 is preferred. Under the so-called 
'gambling' approach (ie, maximax), program &2 is preferred even more strongly. The 
Laplace criterion (using equal weights for all outcomes) does not discriminate between the 
two programs. The same applies to most of the stochastic dominance criteria under 
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consideration. At higher levels of risk aversion (ie, with higher boundaries for the risk 
aversion interval), however, program aj is preferred again. 
10.5 Bayes'theorem 
Most farmers formulate subjective probabilities about uncertain decisions at a point in time. 
If additional information comes available, the farmer has to revise or update the 
probabilities. Many farmers appear to revise their subjective probabilities in an informal 
manner when they receive weather reports, national production estimates, data on domestic 
use and exports, price predictions, and other data that may affect their operation. Such 
probability revisions can be accomplished in a logical and mathematically correct manner 
by applying Bayes' theorem. Bayes' theorem is an elementary theorem of probability 
developed by the eighteenth-century English clergyman Thomas Bayes. This theorem is 
normally developed in introductory courses of statistics, and its logical validity is 
demonstrated in many books on decision theory (Anderson et al., 1977; Barry, 1984; 
Boehlje & Eidman, 1984) 
In Table 10.3 the major components that are needed to explain Bayes' theorem are 
summarized, some of which have been introduced already earlier in this chapter. 
Table 10.3 Summary of the major components of a risky decision problem 
a; = the j t n act or action available to the decision maker 
0j = the i"1 state of nature or possible event 
P(9j) = the prior probability of occurrence of 0j 
Xjj = the consequence, outcome or payoff'that results if a; is chosen and 6j occurs 
Zjç = the k"1 possible forecast from an experiment 
PCZJJÖJ) = the likelihood probability of zj^ occurring given that 9j prevails 
PCGjIzjj) = the posterior probability of 0j given forecast zj, 
c = the cost of the forecast device generating the set {z^} of possible forecasts 
Suppose that the farmer in the example of Table 10.1 can obtain a prediction from the 
veterinarian of the probabilities of the events 9j. The veterinarian may give k possible 
forecasts (k levels of the predictor; z^). Since predictions of uncertain phenomena such as 
price and yield levels for agricultural production are less than perfect, it is important to 
consider the veterinarian's accuracy of the predictions in revising the prior probability 
estimates. The likelihood of obtaining a particular forecast, given the event that occurred 
PCzjjIOj), can be obtained by utilizing data on previous forecasts (z) of the veterinarian and 
the actual outcomes (9). Then Bayes' theorem can be used to combine the prior probabilities 
P(9j) of the farmer and the data on the accuracy of the prediction P(zjil9j) to estimate the 
posterior probabilities P^jlzj,). The posterior probabilities indicate the probability that an 
event will occur given the prediction that has been made. Bayes' theorem can be expressed 
as: 
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P(9ilzk) = P(0i) P(zkl6i) / Si [P(9j) P(zkl9i)] = P(9i,zk) / P(zk) 
In words, the first of these formulas says that the posterior probability of the i t h state, 
given that the k1*1 prediction has been made, is equal to the product of (1) the prior 
probability of the state, and (2) the likelihood probability of the prediction given the state, 
divided by all such products summed over all the states. As the second formula indicates, 
the numerator at the right-hand side is, by definition, just the joint probability of 9j and zk, 
while the denomi-nator is the unconditional probability of occurrence of the particular 
prediction zk. In general, Bayes' formula can be considered a posterior probability (density) 
being proportional to prior probability (density) times likelihood. Bayes' theorem hinges on 
the definition of conditional probability (P(AIB) = P(A and B) / P(B)). 
Now we continue our example on selecting the best animal health program (Table 10.1). 
The farmer asks the veterinarian for advice. Based on past history, the farmer determined the 
accuracy of the predictions of the veterinarian. They are outlined in Table 10.4. The data 
indicate, for example, that if zj (good herd health) was predicted by the veterinarian in the 
past, a good herd health was found in 80% of the cases, an average herd health in 15% of the 
cases, and a bad herd health was never found. The values in other columns of the conditional 
probability matrix are interpreted in a similar manner. 
Table 10.4 Likelihood probabilities of the veterinarian 
Likelihood probabilities P(z[tl0j) 
State of nature (9j) z^  z2 23 
Herd health good 9 j Ö8Ö 02Ö ÖÖÖ 
Herd health average 02 0.15 0.70 0.15 
Herd health bad 03 O00 O20 0.80 
The farmer now wants to combine the predictions received with the prior probabilities using 
Bayes' theorem. The joint probabilities required for the numerator of Bayes' theorem have 
been calculated and recorded in Table 10.5. For example, P(91)P(z1l91) = 0.2x0.80 = 0.16. 
After completing the calculation of the joint probabilities, the denominator of Bayes' 
theorem can be calculated by summing each column. For example, P(z 1 ) = X; P(9j) P(z j 10j) 
= 0.16 + 0.09 + 0.00 = 0.25. Notice that summing the P(zk) for all values of k equals 1. 
Table 10.5 Calculation of the joint probabilities 
State of nature (9j) 
Herd health good 9j 
Herd health average 9 2 
Herd health bad 0 3 
P(zk) 
z1 
0.16 
0.09 
0.00 
0.25 
Joint probabilities P(9j) P(zkl9j) 
z2 
0.04 
0.42 
0.04 
0.50 
z3 
0.00 
0.09 
0.16 
0.25 
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Following Bayes' theorem, the posterior probabilities can be calculated by dividing the joint 
probabilities by the unconditional probability of zk. For example, P(0jlzj) = 0.16 /0.25 = 
0.64. The posterior probabilities are given in Table 10.6. 
Table 10.6 Calculation of the 
State of nature (6;) 
Herd health good 9 j 
Herd health average 62 
Herd health bad 9 3 
posterior probabilities 
z1 
0.64 
0.36 
0.00 
Posterior probabilities P(9jlz|<) 
z2 
0.08 
0.84 
0.08 
z3 
0.00 
0.36 
0.64 
The posterior probabilities replace the prior probabilities estimated in Table 10.1. However, 
here are three sets of posterior probabilities, one for each predicted health situation (zk). The 
next step is to calculate the EMV for each action using each set of posterior probabilities. 
For this, we first have to recalculate the payoff matrix taking into account the costs (c) of 
obtaining the prediction. Suppose that c equals US$200. 
The results obtained, which are based on the payoff values of Table 10.1 and information 
cost of US$200, are shown in Table 10.7. For instance, the EMV of program aj given 
forecast zx is calculated as 1000 x 0.64 + 4000 x 0.36 + 9000 x 0.00 - 200 = US$(2080 -
200) = US$1880. Further inspection of Table 10.7 indicates that aj has the highest EMV for 
prediction of z j (denoted by underlining), while a2 has the highest EMV if Z2 and Z3 are 
predicted. Thus the optimal strategy s for the farmer is {aj, z.^, a2), meaning the farmer 
will maximize EMV by selecting program aj if zj is predicted, and selecting program a2 
if either Z2 or Z3 is predicted. This optimal strategy s is also called Bayes' strategy. 
Table 10.7 EMVs based on posterior probability of 9/ given forecast zk and information cost c 
Forecast 
zj z2 z3 EMVa 
Program a{: EMV^IzjJ 1880 3960 7000 
Program a2: EMV(a2lzk) -4800 4720 13760 
a
 Calculated as EMV(a;lzk) = I j [(XJ; - c) P(9jlzk)] 
10.6 Value of information 
It is reasonable to ask whether the use of the predictor will increase the farmer's EMV. 
Moreover, there is a charge for veterinary services (cost c of the prediction). A farmer will 
like to know whether the increase in EMV exceeds the cost of the service. These questions 
can be answered by comparing the EMV using the optimal strategy with the predictor 
(Bayes' strategy) and the EMV for the optimal action without the predictor. If this value is 
negative, then the additional information provided by the forecast is not worth purchasing. 
The maximum price that should be paid for the forecast is given by the value of c for which 
these two EMVs (with and without the additional information) are exactly the same. 
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Now consider the case of a perfectly forecasting veterinarian. Since a perfect predictor is 
never wrong, it implies a posterior probability distribution of unity for some state of nature 
and zero for the rest. Thus, using a prime to denote perfection, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the k*" perfect forecast signal zk' and some state of nature, say 
0j, so that we can denote the ktn perfect forecast by zj'. Further, by Bayes' theorem P(z j') 
= P(6j). With a perfect forecast device the optimal act can always be chosen. This results 
in the EMV of a perfect predictor. The EMV of perfect information can then be calculated 
as the difference between the EMV of the perfect predictor and the EMV without the 
predictor (ie, without additional information). 
Let us return to our animal health example. The EMV of the optimal strategy with the 
additional information from the veterinarian, the Bayes' strategy s {a^, ^ ^ equals 
US$6270 (see Table 10.8). As the EMV of the optimal decision without the predictor (a2> is 
US$4800 (see previous section and Table 10.8), the EMV of the forecast device turns out 
to be US$6270 - 4800 = US$1470. Because this value is positive, the additional information 
expected from the forecast device is worth purchasing. 
Table 10.8 Value of information (in US$) 
EMV of optimal decision (aj) without additional information: 
Maxj [Xy P(9i)] = -10 000 x 0.2 + 5000 x 0.6 + 19 000 x 0.2 = 4800a 
EMV of optimal (Bayes') strategy (s = {aj, &2< a 2 ^ w ' m additional information: 
Ik[maxj EMV(ajlzk)] P(zk) = 1880 x 0.25 + 4720 x 0.50 + 13 760 x 0.25 = 6270b 
EMV forecast device: 6270 - 4800 = 1470 
EMV of the optimal strategy based upon perfect predictor (ZJ'): 
I j [maxj EMV(Xjj - clzj') P(8j) = 800 x 0.2 + 4800 x 0.6 + 18 800 x 0.2 = 6800c 
EMV of perfect predictor: 6800 - 4800 = 2000 
See Table 10.1 for P(9j) and xy 
i 
c
 See Table 10.1 for P(0j) and xy-; c = US$200 
b
 See Table 10.5 for P(zk) and Table 10.7 for s" and the corresponding EMVs 
The EMV of the optimal strategy based upon a perfect predictor is also determined in 
Table 10.8. The EMV of such perfect information is US$6800. So, the EMV of the perfect 
predictor is US$6800 - 4800 = US$2000. This makes the efficiency of our predictor relative 
to a perfect predictor, both assumed to cost US$200, (1470 / 2000) x 100% = 73.5%. 
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Work through the example on decision analysis, a left-displaced abomasum case, in Chapter 
19. For three different strategies, the payoff matrix is given. You have to find the best strategy 
according to different criteria: the EMV, the maximin, the minimax regret and the maximax 
criterion (as discussed in section 10.4). In the next part of the model you can practise working 
with a utility function and 'translating' this into risk attitude (see section 10.3). Lastly, the 
model leads you through the Bayes' theorem (see section 10.5) and calculations will be made 
on the value of information (see section 10.6). The time needed for this exercise is 
approximately 60 minutes. 
10.7 Multiperson decision making 
The model of risky choice, as outlined above, relates primarily to a situation where there is 
one decision maker whose beliefs and preferences are to be used in the analysis and who 
bears the consequences of the choice. Often, however, more than one person will be 
involved in any decision and/or affected by the consequences. Unfortunately, the extension 
of the methods of decision analysis to multiperson decision problems is not a simple matter. 
Three multiperson decision situations can be considered of particular importance in 
agriculture: (1) group choice situations, wherein a number of people are collectively 
responsible for a decision, (2) situations with many individual and independent decision 
makers, and (3) social choice situations, where the power of decision rests with government 
or one of its agencies, but where many people are affected by the consequences. The last one 
especially relates to compulsory programs for contagious disease control and, therefore, will 
now be discussed in more detail. 
Policymakers often tend to react in a risk-averse fashion, fearing the personal consequences 
of being seen to have made decisions that turned out bad. The uncertainties of particular 
public projects or programs, however, are often rather insignificant when measured against 
the total performance of the economy. That is why economic theory teaches that 
governments make the best economic choice among risky projects by using risk-neutral 
decision rules, such as the expected monetary value criterion (Little & Mirrlees, 1974). 
There are two major reasons to consider risk-related decision rules to be appropriate for 
the choice among projects: (1) when they are unusually large, eg, affecting 10% or more 
of national income, or (2) when their consequences are not spread widely, and fairly evenly, 
among the population. The latter will often apply to contagious disease outbreaks, since 
losses primarily affect producers' income, especially on farms and in those areas that are 
actually affected by the disease (Berentsen et al., 1990). A better insight into the potential 
consequences of the various decision rules and risk attitudes may be helpful anyway to 
provide useful information for a more thoughtful and rational decision-making approach. 
Stochastic dominance with respect to a function is commonly considered the most 
promising approach in this type of analysis, but requires at least some information on the 
policymakers' preferences concerning the outcomes. Empirical research to determine these 
preferences in agriculture has been sparse so far. 
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10.8 Concluding remarks 
Risk and uncertainty are undoubtedly important in animal health management. Advice and 
modelling that are to support decisions in this area, therefore, should include appropriate 
(subjective) probability estimates for the relevant variables under consideration. Decision 
analysis and Bayes' theorem are considered worthwhile approaches for ensuring that 
farmers get advice and make decisions which are consistent with (a) their personal beliefs 
about the risks and uncertainties surrounding the decision, and (b) their preferences for the 
possible outcomes. It can also help to provide a more rational basis for decision making in 
the public domain, and to determine the economic value of additional information to reduce 
and/or predict the risks and uncertainties. A good risky decision, however, does not 
guarantee a good outcome. That would only be possible with perfect foresight (ie, in the 
absence of uncertainty). It does assure, however, that the decision made is the best possible 
one given the available information. 
Appropriate decision rules are considered a major component of a risky decision problem 
(Boehlje & Eidman, 1984). The most widely used expected monetary value criterion does 
not always tell the whole story, as shown in the - simplified - example in this chapter. Less 
advanced criteria (such as maximin or minimax) are considered not to be appropriate from 
a theoretical point of view. Utility functions make it possible to provide the most 
comprehensive approach, including a trade-off between the average outcome and its 
variation, but will not always be easy to carry out and apply in actual field advice. Stochastic 
dominance criteria are commonly considered promising tools in this type of analysis. User-
friendly software has become available to make the application of this type of advanced 
criteria much easier and accessible (Goh et al., 1989). 
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